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FM AMEMBASSY RABAT  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6351  
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0691  
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 4386  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3281  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5698  
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3468  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4604  
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0218  
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RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 2934

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000683

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TAGS: [PBTS](#) [PHUM](#) [PREL](#) [WI](#) [MO](#) [SF](#) [UNSC](#)

SUBJECT: THEIR RABAT CHARGE SAYS SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT BE  
HELPFUL ON WESTERN SAHARA

Classified By: Pol/Couns Craig Karp for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: South African Charge to Morocco Charl Moller told Polcouns April 16 that South Africa will not abandon the principle of self determination for the Western Sahara without wavering, it would accept a political settlement agreed to by the POLISARIO. Moller said that South Africa is in touch with the POLISARIO and might be prevailed upon to urge the FOLISARIO to enter unconditional talks. Moller said internal pressure was mounting on the South Africans to do something about Zimbabwe. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Moller said South Africa (SA) sent Deputy Director General for International Organizations (A/S equivalent) along with North Africa desk officer to Rabat last week for consultations, the latter apparently proceeded to New York for the discussion on the Sahara. The South Africans pressed Rabat on improving bilateral relations. This is important to South Africa, which supplies 70 percent of Morocco's coal. They have not had Ambassadors for some time and S.Africa would like to send one.

¶3. (C) Moller said that the Moroccans only wanted to talk about Western Sahara. While SA had no flexibility on self-determination they were more flexible about a political solution. SA has had indications of considerable differences of views in the Polisario hierarchy, particularly among younger members. People are getting tired of the desert, and the new generation has grown up without knowing the armed struggle. Close ties with Cuba have rubbed off on some and remains reflected in leadership rhetoric.

¶4. (C) Moller believed that South Africa could support the notion of talks without preconditions, and could be mobilized to help convince the POLISARIO. He volunteered a suggestion that USUN sit down with the S.African Mission and solicit their help in getting the parties together (acknowledging the PR is hardcore on self determination).

¶5. (C) As a former desk officer for Zimbabwe, Moller complained that the situation there is a real problem for South Africa-- an internal problem. Refugees come to live in the townships and do not fit in due to language difficulties,. They are perceived by Township residents as trying to take away scarce jobs, which has caused outbreaks of strife and contributing to an increase in xenophobia. Zimbabweans, he said are perceived as being responsible for

an intensification of violent crime. He would not speculate as to whether or when this would force the SA government to put decisive pressure on Mugabe.

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RILEY